INTRODUCTION
During the 20 th century "pragmatism" emerged as the leading American philosophy and policy analysis -also called "legal realism" -became the dominant method of interpreting American law. 1 The lightning speed with which same-sex marriage is gaining acceptance in the United States is due to the fact that Americans embrace realistic rather than ideological forms of thinking, and the growing recognition of same-sex marriage in the law is due to the fact that we interpret our Constitution in accordance with realistic analysis.
Part I of this paper briefly describes the great strides that same-sex marriage has made in the United States over the past decade. Parts II, III, IV, and V summarize how realist analysis transformed American philosophy, jurisprudence, and constitutional law during the 20 th century, resulting in the emergence of a reality-based "equality principle." Part VI explains how the struggle for marriage equality for gay and lesbian couples has advanced because of these realistic methods for making choices in policy and the law.
I. THE RAPID ACCEPTANCE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
Over the past 16 years American attitudes towards same-sex marriage have shifted dramatically. According to Gallup, in 1996 68% of Americans were opposed to same-sex marriage; only 27% of Americans were in favor of allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry. 2 In contrast, in 2011 for the first time Gallup found that 53% of Americans approved of marriage equality for same-sex couples with only 45% opposed. 3 Legal recognition in the states has followed in the wake of social acceptance. In 2003 not a single state permitted gays and lesbians to marry their partners. 4 In 2012 nine states and the District of Columbia recognize same-sex marriage. 5 More than 85 million people live in these ten jurisdictions, constituting more than one-fourth of the American population. 6 The trend towards recognition of same-sex marriage seems to be accelerating. The Gallup poll mentioned earlier showed a massive swing on the issue in one year, from 44-53 opposed in 2010 to 53-45 in favor in 2011. This rapid movement towards acceptance of marriage equality is also evident from the recent trend of decisions by state courts and legislatures extending recognition of same-sex unions. Of the four state supreme court decisions opposing same-sex marriage, three were handed down "long ago" in 2006 and one in 2007. 7 Of the four state supreme court decisions approving same-sex marriage, one was handed down in 2003 (Massachusetts), two in 2008, and one in 2009. 8 The six statutes recognizing same-sex marriage were all enacted since 2009. 9 Finally, since 2010 three federal district courts and one federal appeals court have issued decisions striking down laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.
10 Two other actions are pending in federal district courts.
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What accounts for this rapid shift in American life and law? What made this change possible? It is in large part due to the fact that Americans embrace a realistic approach to the development of public policy and the interpretation of the law.
II. REALITY-BASED AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
Americans have always been a practical people. Alexis de Toqueville observed of our ancestors, "I think that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States."
12 Rejecting "speculative studies" as well as "tradition" and "national prejudices," Americans, he said: "like to discern the object which engages their attention with extreme clearness; they therefore strip off as much as possible all that covers it, they rid themselves of whatever separates them from it, they remove whatever conceals it from sight, in order to view it more closely and in the broad light of day." 13 De Toqueville attributed our independent strain of thought and realistic frame of reference to the influence of democracy. "Equality begets in man the desire of judging of everything for himself: it gives him, in all things, a taste for the tangible and the real, a contempt for tradition and for forms."
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American philosophy continued to be grounded in "realism." In the 1870s the brilliant physical scientist Charles Sanders Peirce argued for a "pragmatic" understanding of scientific principles, an idea he eventually called "pragmaticism." 15 In 1907 American philosopher William James published his landmark work Pragmatism: A New Name for Old Ways of Thinking, dedicated to John Stuart Mill and citing John Dewey. 16 In Lecture VI, Pragmatism's Conception of Truth, James distinguishes "pragmatism" from "intellectualism" on the ground that pragmatists demand proof of the truth of a concept from experience:
Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. "Grant an idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?"
The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: TRUE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CAN ASSIMILATE, VALIDATE, CORROBORATE AND VERIFY. FALSE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CANNOT. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as. 17 The popular philosopher, educator, and social reformer John Dewey described how pragmatic philosophy operates in the life of the individual. Dewey explained that truth emerges from the interaction of an organism with its environment; truth is determined experientially and is proven by its usefulness to the organism. 18 As one authority states: "Thus Dewey adopted the term "instrumentalism" as a descriptive appellation for his new approach."
At the same time that the theories of pragmatism and instrumentalism became ascendant in American philosophy, a similar approach took hold in jurisprudential circles. It is to that theory -"legal realism" -that I now turn.
III. REALITY-BASED AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
The school of "legal realism" is most often associated with American academicians, but it was brought into our law and became the central feature of American jurisprudence through the action of four great judges: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, and Learned Billings Hand. Today, policy analysis lies at the heart of constitutional law. It is the defining characteristic of the fundamental constitutional standards we call "strict scrutiny" and the "rational basis test."
The Realist Academicians
Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School, is generally credited with founding the school of "legal realism." In a 1912 article Pound used the term "sociological jurisprudence" to describe this new method of analysis. 20 Pound insisted that in interpreting the law judges should "take more account, and more intelligent account, of the social facts upon which law must proceed and to which it is to be applied." The choice which a judge makes of one analogy rather than another is an expression of ... a value-judgment; and the possibility of competing analogies therefore arises not merely or so much out of the doubtfulness of the factual resemblances among his materials, but rather out of the possibility of differences of opinion as to the comparative value of the different results which one analogy or the other would bring about.
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Karl Llewellyn, a leading realist who became a principal drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code, described sociological jurisprudence in the following terms:
[T]he central problem of all law has to do with this still almost completely neglected descriptive science, with this "legal sociology," this natural science of living law. What we need to study, what we must know, is not how a legal rule reads, nor how a philosophically correct rule would read, but what the legal rule means. Not in ... the heaven of legal concepts, but in human experience. What happens in life with it? What does a law mean to ordinary people? 23 Today "legal realism" so influences academic legal thought that it has spawned multiple independent schools of realistic analysis. On the right, the school of "law and economics" uses the science of economics in interpreting the law in order to foster economic efficiency and wealth maximization. 24 On the left, various schools of "critical" legal analysis -critical legal studies, critical race theory, critical feminist theory, and many others -insist that law must be understood in the context of its effect on oppressed populations. 25 All of these schools of jurisprudence share the assumption that the law should be interpreted in the light of human experience.
The Realist Judges
The names of the judges who embraced legal realism and brought it into American law are familiar every lawyer: Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Hand. Each of them emphasized that judges must take into account the consequences of their interpretations of the law -how the law would affect people in their daily lives. Their contributions to our realist understanding of the law are briefly described below.
a. Oliver Wendell Holmes -The Skeptic
Oliver Wendell Holmes is justly regarded as one of the greatest American judges. In the field of Constitutional Law we are indebted to him for writing courageous dissents laying the groundwork for two fundamentally important doctrines: the right of the individual to freedom of speech and the power of the legislature to enact economic legislation. In addition, Holmes paved the way for the adoption of realistic modes of legal analysis. All three of these accomplishments were due to the fact that Holmes was a profound skeptic.
In the area of First Amendment law, Holmes is justly celebrated for conceiving the "marketplace of ideas," the notion that political and social truth is most likely to be discovered if there is "free trade in ideas." 26 The origin of this doctrine lay in Holmes' personal philosophy, a philosophy he explained to Judge Learned Hand as they debated the constitutionality of federal laws that were being used to crush dissent to the First World War. On June 24, 1918, Holmes wrote to Hand, "I don't bother about absolute truth or even inquire whether there is such a thing …." 27 Holmes' skepticism eventually led him to believe that it was unconstitutional for the government to suppress the expression of unpopular opinions.
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The same deep streak of skepticism led Holmes to take the position that the courts must accord a presumption of constitutionality to economic legislation. Dissenting in Lochner v. New York 29 Holmes wrote:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.
30
He added:
[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
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Holmes coined a number of famous aphorisms that reflect his commitment to realism in legal analysis. In Lochner he stated: "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." 32 In New York Trust Co. v. Eisner 33 he said: "a page of history is worth more than a volume of logic."
34 And in The Common Law he wrote: "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." 35 The point of each of these sayings is that judges must take human experience into account in interpreting the law.
Holmes challenged traditional methods of legal analysis from the bench. Brandeis challenged the traditional paradigm from the bar. 27 See THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER 28 (John H. Garrey & Frederick Schauer eds., 1996) (Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Billings Learned Hand, June 24, 1918). 28 See Abrams, 250 U.S., at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (sarcastically stating, "Persecution for the expression of opinion seems to me to be perfectly logical."); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (stating, "If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way."). 29 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 30 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 31 Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 32 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 33 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (striking down maximum hour legislation). 34 Id. at 349 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 35 Oliver Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
Louis Brandeis -The Reformer
Before his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1916, Louis Brandeis was the "People's Lawyer," fighting on behalf of the average person against corrupt and abusive corporate practices. He achieved one of his greatest victories in 1908 the case of Muller v. Oregon, 36 where he persuaded the Supreme Court to uphold a state law which provided that women could work in factories no more than ten hours per day. In support of his clients he submitted a 113-page brief. 37 The brief contained only two pages devoted to legal analysis; the remainder summarized dozens of sociological and economic studies of the effect of long hours of work on women and their families. 38 Thus was born the "Brandeis brief."
Explaining his approach to legal advocacy Brandeis said: "The method I have tried to employ in arguing cases has been inductive, reasoning from the facts." 39 In Muller Brandeis showed the Court why human experience demanded that the law be upheld.
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo -The Policy Analyst of the Common Law Justice Cardozo was the greatest common law judge that the United States has produced. His opinions fill American casebooks on the law of contracts and torts. 40 The method that he mastered in developing the common law was to examine a line of cases looking not for factual similarities but rather for the thread of policy that ran through the law.
One of the foundational cases in the law of tort is Cardozo's decision in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
41 in which the New York State Court of Appeals determined that an automobile driver could recover for damages suffered when a defective wheel fell apart. This case appears in nearly every casebook on torts because it illustrates how to choose between two different lines of authority, a common problem in the common law. The New York courts had on many occasions ruled that the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright (finding no liability for injuries cause by a defective wagon wheel) was good law, 42 but they had also ruled that if an item was "inherently dangerous" like scaffolding then the manufacturer could be held liable if it was negligently made. 43 One might take the position that an automobile is more like a wagon than it is like a scaffold, but writing for the majority Cardozo found that the operative principle should 36 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum hour legislation for women). 37 42 See id. at 392 (no liability for defective wagon wheel). 43 See id. at 393 (liability for defective scaffold).
be whether or not the product, if negligently made, would be "inherently dangerous" to the public. 44 He wrote:
Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel today. The principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be. 45 Similarly, in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 46 Cardozo rejected the notion of "exact performance" under the law of contract and instead adopted the rule of "substantial performance." In the case of a minor or technical breach of contract, Cardozo ruled that the measure of damages is not the cost of rectifying the error but rather the difference in value between the promised performance and the actual performance. 47 In rejecting the clear rule requiring exact performance of a contract for the more ambiguous standard permitting substantial performance plus a measure of damages for any reduction in value, Cardozo said:
Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment of a just result will be troubled by a classification where the lines of division are so wavering and blurred. Something, doubtless, may be said on the score of consistency and certainty in favor of a stricter standard. The courts have balanced such considerations against those of equity and fairness, and found the latter to be the weightier. 48 In his masterpiece Nature of the Judicial Process Cardozo explained the central role that policy analysis must play in legal reasoning:
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence . . . . Logic and history and custom have their place. We will shape the law to conform to them when we may; but only within bounds. The end which the law serves will dominate them all. 49 Learned Billings Hand: The Mathematical Consequentialist:
Judge Hand -perhaps the greatest American judge never to serve on the United States Supreme Court -advanced realist analysis by demonstrating how the pertinent values served by the law might be rationally balanced. His most famous contribution to American law was in the 1947 case United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 50 where he reduced the law of tort to a clear, concise, and elegant formula. The question in that case was whether the owner of a barge was 44 See id. at 389 (stating, "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger."). 45 Id. at 391. 46 230 N.Y. 239 (1921) . 47 See id. at 241 (stating, "an omission, both trivial and innocent, will sometimes be atoned for by allowance of the resulting damage, and will not always be the breach of a condition to be followed by a forfeiture."). 48 Id. at 242-243. 49 Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921 Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.
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According to Hand, liability under the law of tort is not predicated upon some a priori concept of "duty" or "morality" but rather by reference to the likelihood and foreseeability that a person's actions will harm others.
The following portion of this article describes how the realist movement transformed American Constitutional Law during the second half of the 20 th century.
IV. REALISM IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In the second half of the 20 th century the realist movement transformed both the process and the substance of American Constitutional Law. It not only led to the overruling of longestablished constitutional precedent, it revolutionized how the constitutionality of laws is determined.
Brown v. Board of Education
The most important decision of the 20th century is without question Brown v. Board of Education. 52 In that case the Supreme Court overruled the longstanding principle of "separate but equal" and overturned the deeply rooted social custom of racial segregation. 53 In writing the opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren could not rely upon the standard interpretive techniques of tradition, precedent, or the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Precedent and tradition both supported the separation of the races. 54 Original intent, said the Court, was both indeterminate and no longer relevant in light of how much the field of public education had changed since 1868. 55 Providing separate educational 51 Id. at 173 52 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down state-sponsored racial segregation in the public schools). 53 See id. at 494-495 (overruling Plessy and stating, "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."). 54 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (finding that legally enforced racial segregation on trains is consistent with "the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people"). 55 See Brown, 347 U.S., at 489 (finding evidence as to the intent of the framers of the 14 th Amendment "inconclusive" on the question of racial segregation in the public schools); id. at 489-490, 493 (citing the changes that had occurred since 1868 in the field of public education); id. at 492-493 (stating, "we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation."). facilities for the children of different races is unconstitutional, said the Court, because "it may affect their hearts and minds in ways unlikely ever to be undone." 56 In short it was the consequences flowing from the practice of racial segregation that made the doctrine of "separate but equal" unconstitutional -not its pedigree in the law.
The Rational Basis and Strict Scrutiny Tests
The realist revolution utterly revised constitutional analysis. At the time of Brown the Supreme Court was moving towards a consequentialist form of reasoning for all cases involving constitutional rights. As a result of this change laws that do not infringe individual rights are evaluated under the "rational basis" test, while laws that do affect fundamental rights are subject to the "strict scrutiny" test.
In 1938 in the case of United States v. Carolene Products
57 the Supreme Court announced a highly deferential test for determining the constitutionality of ordinary legislative enactments.
58 This standard -the "rational basis test" -does not evaluate the constitutionality of laws by reference to tradition or original intent. Instead, under this standard the courts determine constitutionality in light of the goal that the legislation is intended to achieve. So long as the law is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest" the law must be upheld. 59 In footnote 4 of Carolene Products, however, the Court warned that laws infringing fundamental rights or affecting the rights of minority groups could be subjected to "more exacting judicial scrutiny." 60 By 1965 the Supreme Court had fully developed the "more exacting judicial scrutiny" that it had referred to Carolene Products -a standard that it called "strict scrutiny." In Griswold v. Connecticut 61 the Court held that when strict scrutiny applies, the government must demonstrate not only that the law has some tendency to achieve a legitimate governmental purpose, but that the law is necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental purpose. 62 56 Id. at 494. 57 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding federal "filled milk" regulation under rational basis test). 58 See id. at 152. The Court stated:
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. 59 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating, "The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."). 60 304 U.S., at 152 fn. 4 (foreshadowing use of strict scrutiny in evaluating the constitutionality of legislation affecting fundamental rights or minority groups). 61 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down anti-contraception law under strict scrutiny test). 62 Id. at 497. The Court stated:
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling," The law must be shown "necessary, and not merely rationally related to, the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."
Id. (citations omitted).
Both rational basis and strict scrutiny are consequentialist forms of analysis. Under both tests the constitutionality of a law is determined not by its conformity to custom or existing doctrine, but rather by reference to the "ends" that the law seeks to achieve and the "means" used to accomplish those ends. With rational basis, the consequence that the law seeks to accomplish need only be "legitimate" and the law itself need only have "some tendency" to achieve that purpose. When strict scrutiny applies the law must serve a "compelling" governmental purpose and the law must be both "likely" to achieve that goal and be the "least restrictive means," meaning that the government's goal must be sufficiently important and the likelihood of achieving that goal must be sufficiently probable so as to justify both the infringement on constitutional rights and the unintended consequences flowing from the enforcement of the law. Strict scrutiny is a consequentialist form of analysis that closely resembles Hand's formula B<PL. 63 The Constitution's adherence to realist analysis is nowhere more evident than in how it has come to interpret the principle of equality that is inherent in the concept of Equal Protection. The realistic standard that the Supreme Court has developed may be referred to as the "equality principle."
V. THE REALITY-BASED EQUALITY PRINCIPLE
In modern decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause the Supreme Court has adhered to a simple yet powerful idea -a basic moral concept that may be called the "equality principle." This fundamental principle is that people who are "similarly situated" must be treated the same. As a legal standard the equality principle confers great power and grave responsibility upon the courts. It requires the courts to determine whether two groups of people are or are not similar in a particular context; if they are similar, the law must treat them the same.
The Supreme Court has consistently applied this principle only in the past half-century, but its origin may be traced to the latter part of the 19 th century. In 1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 64 the San Francisco Board of Supervisors had denied permits to all Chinese residents to operate laundries. In determining the constitutionality of the city's action, the Court articulated the equality principle in the negative; the Court stated that a law is constitutional only if it treats in like fashion all persons who are similarly situated:
"Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application if, within the sphere of its operation, it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment."
Applying this principle in Yick Wo the Supreme Court reversed the discriminatory actions of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, finding their conduct to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 66 The Supreme Court began to routinely invoke the equality principle during the latter portion of the 20 th century. In 1971 in Reed v. Reed 67 the Court approximated the language and followed the example of Yick Wo. In Reed the Court struck down an Idaho law that preferred men over women in the administration of estates.
68 Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Burger said:
By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause. 69 In 1984 in the case of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centers 70 the Court had to decide whether persons with mental disabilities were entitled to establish a group home in a neighborhood that was zoned for group living establishments like fraternities and old-age homes. 71 Despite finding that intelligence is not a suspect classification, 72 Justice Bryon White ruled that persons with disabilities did have that right because they aren't different, in any relevant way, from those other groups, in the context of being permitted to live together in a group home. 73 In articulating the general principle that governed the case he said:
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. 74 In 2003, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 75 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor echoed White's words in coming to the conclusion that gays and lesbians could not be imprisoned for engaging in homosexual sex:
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 'is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.'
From the foregoing cases it appears that the equality principle applies across the board not matter what distinctions the law draws among different groups of people. Race has been found to be a suspect classification, 77 gender is quasi-suspect, 78 intelligence is non-suspect, 79 and the suspectness of sexual orientation has yet to be determined by the Supreme Court. 80 But the Court applied the equality principle to all of these groups, and in none of these cases did the Court find that their characteristics warranted treating people differently. In each case the Court found that the different groups of people were "similarly situated." Are gay and lesbian couples similar to heterosexual couples with respect to marriage? Under the equality principle that question must be answered in order to determine whether or not the Equal Protection Clause protects their right to marry. In accordance with American philosophy and jurisprudence the answer to that question must be based upon proven facts and actual experience, not by reference to traditional moral and religious beliefs. The following portion of this article describes how advances in social science have demonstrated that gays and lesbians should be granted an equal right to marry.
VI. REALITY-BASED ANALYSIS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY
What changed after 2007 that generated numerous victories for gay and lesbian couples in American courts and legislatures? Very simply, American judges and legislators came to believe that there are no significant differences between same-sex and different-sex couples in the context of marriage. This was also the overwhelming consensus of social science researchers.
The Prop 8 Trial
The equality of same-sex couples was unequivocally demonstrated during the "Prop 8 Trial" conducted by federal District Judge Vaughn Walker. 81 The legal issue in that case was whether Proposition 8, an amendment to the California Constitution taking away the right of same-sex couples to marry, was constitutional under Equal Protection. Judge Walker invited the parties to offer evidence and expert testimony on the questions whether sexual orientation is a "suspect classification," whether gay lesbian couples were capable of performing the responsibilities of marriage, and whether their families would benefit from marriage.
The plaintiffs in the Prop 8 Trial called nine expert witnesses, each of them possessing a prestigious degree and holding a position at a leading university. 82 The direct and cross examination of these witnesses extended to thousands of pages of the trial transcript. 83 They testified that gays and lesbians have been historically discriminated against; that compared to heterosexuals they lack effective political power; that sexual orientation is rarely chosen or subject to change; that same-sex couples love each other just as much and are as devoted to each other as different-sex couples; that gay and lesbian couples are as good at parenting as differentsex couples; that marriage will benefit the couples, their children, and their families; and that the admission of same-sex couples to the institution of marriage will not in the least harm existing marriages or marriage as an institution. 84 The defendants in the Prop 8 case called but two witnesses, David Blankenhorn and Kenneth Miller. 85 Blankenhorn earned a Masters in comparative social history from the University of Warwick, England. 86 Although he had authored several books and articles on same-sex marriage, he had conducted no peer-reviewed research. 87 89 Dr. Miller, a, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, was declared qualified as an expert in political science generally but not on the political power of gays and lesbians specifically. 90 The trial court ruled his testimony admissible but entitled to only limited weight. 91 The defendants declined to call any other witnesses.
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The trial court rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs striking down Proposition 8. In support of its ruling the court entered dozens of findings, each supported by multiple references to the trial record. Here are a few of the court's findings:
48. Same-sex couples are identical to opposite-sex couples in the characteristics relevant to the ability to form successful marital unions. Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples have happy, satisfying relationships and form deep emotional bonds and strong commitments to their partners. Standardized measures of relationship satisfaction, relationship adjustment and love do not differ depending on whether a couple is same-sex or opposite-sex. 93 50. Same-sex couples receive the same tangible and intangible benefits from marriage that opposite-sex couples receive. 94 55. Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex marriages. 95 56. The children of same-sex couples benefit when their parents can marry. 96 70. The gender of a child's parent is not a factor in a child's adjustment. The sexual orientation of an individual does not determine whether that individual can be a good parent. Children raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as children raised by heterosexual parents to be healthy, successful and welladjusted. The research supporting this conclusion is accepted beyond serious debate in the field of developmental psychology. 97 The foregoing findings were pertinent only because the constitutionality of Proposition 8 was dependent upon the consequences that would flow from the judge's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: the effects of the law on same-sex couples, their children, and all other married persons. If in fact same-sex couples are "similarly situated" to different-sex couples with respect to marriage, then Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause. It was the realitybased "equality principle" that made the expert testimony relevant and material to the constitutional question before the court.
The expert witnesses did not testify as to the ultimate legal conclusion to be derived from their testimony -that is, they did not testify that Proposition 8 is constitutional or unconstitutional. In that sense they did not testify about what the law is. Instead, they simply laid the factual predicate upon which the court based its decision finding Proposition 8 to be unconstitutional.
The Prop 8 Trial wasn't necessary. If he had chosen, Judge Walker could simply have taken judicial notice of the "legislative facts" that were at issue. 98 As one eminent authority has stated, "In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law, the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion." 99 Judge Walker could instead have simply consulted historical, sociological, and political science sources identified by the parties or of his own choosing. For example, in Brown v. Board of Education the Court simply cited seven authorities from the field of psychology in support of its finding that racial segregation harms children's hearts and minds.
But Judge Walker did conduct the Prop 8 Trial to determine whether or not sexual orientation is a suspect classification and what the effect of marriage equality would be on samesex couples and different-sex couples. What is remarkable about Judge Walker's decision is that these matters are pure questions of law. In essence Judge Walker treated the issues under consideration as if they were questions of fact subject to the rules of evidence and capable of being proven true or false. Experts on these questions were subject to cross-examination, "the greatest engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."
